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ECONOMIC REGULATION OF AIR TRANSPORT
By SELIG ALTSCHUL

With the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the air
transport industry was given a new lease on life. Prior to this
event the industry was rapidly approaching financial ruin. At that
time it was estimated that of the $120,000,000 of private investment
made in American air transportation, over $60,000,000 was gone.
Moreover, the equity of the entire industry was valued at less than
$40,000,000. Today, financial stability has been introduced in the
air transport group-and despite its problems arising from the national defense effort, it is firmly established as America's coming
new industry.
Prior to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, aviation's many problems had been parceled out piecemeal to whatever Federal agency
seemed best suited to cope with them. The Post Office Department
awarded mail contracts, the Interstate Commerce Commission fixed
rates, the Department of Commerce handled airways and safety
regulation, the Department of Agriculture provided weather reports
and the Departments of State, War, Navy and Treasury all participated to varying degrees. Under such circumstances it was only
a natural expectancy that chaotic regulations would prevail. Transport companies, in the struggle to obtain control of new air routes,
had been bidding-so low that about four-fifths of them were estimated to have failed. The obvious need was for a single agency,
primarily concerned with the development of civil aviation-with
both the power to regulate and assist this development. That agency
appeared in the form of the Civil Aeronautics Authority.
It is important to note, however, that the Civil Aeronautics
Act did not automatically or with a magician's wand create a new
golden era for the air lines. Congress through the Civil Aeronautics
Act merely provided constructive public machinery and broad policies through which the strong growth characteristics of the industry
could be channelled. No longer, for example, were air lines permitted to bid or compete on any bases that would lead to insolvency.
An effort was to be made to provide compensation to the extent
deemed necessary for proper service and growth.
It was through the power to fix fair and reasonable rates for the
carriage of mail, however, that the Authority began to exercise potent
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economic regulation of the air transport industry. This regulation
and responsibility is well expressed by the General Counsel of the
Authority in testifying before the Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations, House of Representatives, on the Independent
Office Appropriation Bill on January 25, 1939. General Counsel
Guthrie stated:
"The Civil Aeronautics Authority comes in charge with the
responsibility for fixing the compensation of the air carriers for
carrying mail without any limitations whatsoever except, first, that
they must do that with due regard to the honesty, economy and
efficiency of the management, pay the carriers a compensation which
will take care of all their service to the public. Compensation is not
to be fixed solely with reference to the amount of mail that they
carry, or the service to the Post Office Department. The Authority
is required to look after the entire enterprise."
While this broad objective may appear to be a simple attainment, complications arise in view of the admixture of several seemingly extraneous factors. The air mail carriers, for the most part,
since their inception, have been engaged in the business of carrying
passengers and express. At the outset, the latter named services
entailed substantial operating losses. In view of such circumstance,
Congress showed some inclination to foster air transportation but
tried to avoid any subsidy. This is evident by the fact that in its
appropriations, Congress tried to make certain that the service would
be conducted at no net loss to the Government. This was done by the
simple expedient of limiting payments to air mail contractors to the
extent of postal revenues derived from the sale of air mail service
to the public. Table I illustrates this Congressional philosophy as
well as the trend of air mail operations.
TABLE I*
DOMESTIC AIR MAIL PAYMENTS
Fiscal Year Revenue- Miles
Ended
Flown
June 30 (000 Omitted)

1940
1939
1938
1937
1936
1935

59,191
52,049
46,166
39,959
38,701
31,149

Pound-Miles
Air Mail
Pay to
Pay Per
Flown
Postage
Air Mail
Pay Per Pound-Mile
(000,000
Revenues
Contractors Plane-Mile Flown
Omitted) (000 Omitted)(000 Omitted)
Flown
(Mills)

18,675
15,818
14,137
12,732
9,772
6,790

Subject to final adjustment.

$19,122
16,326
15,301
12,440
9,700
6,590

*$18,679 $ .316
* 16,768
.322
14,741
.319
13,166
.329
12,178
.315
8,835
.284

.98
1.05
1.04
1.03
1.25
1.30
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Yet, a Civil Aeronautics Authority General Counsel in speaking
of the Authority's responsibility in the fixing of mail compensation
states, "It is pretty frankly a subsidy to the industry that is to be
granted on the bases of economy, efficiency and honesty with which
the business is run."
This realistic attitude is generally accepted by all concerned.
The air lines themselves, however, have no desire for any permanent
subsidy. This was clearly indicated by Col. Gorrel, President of
the Air Transport Association of America, when at the House
hearings preceding the enactment of the CAA; he said: "This
industry does not desire to be permanently subsidized. We wish to
stand on our own feet financially, with private capital."
The fact nevertheless remains that regardless of the equity in air
mail compensation, the industry will have the tinge of public subsidy
through federal airway aids, airports and similar facilities. However,
these are no greater subsidies than land grants were to the railroads,
highways to the automobile industry and reduced postal rates to
newspapers and magazines.
In any event, the Authority has the responsibility of determining fair and reasonable rates for the carriage of air mail.
It is obvious that there is no necessary relation between the
actual cost of flying the mail to the carrier and the postal receipts
derived by the Government. As a public service, much of the mail
is carried at a substantial net loss to the Post Office Department. It is
virtually impossible to determine the actual costs for flying the
mail; hence it is difficult to apply compensation on this basis. It is
known, however, that there are no lines today that can haul mail
for the same price that they can haul passengers or express.
The difficulties encountered in determining equitable methods of
compensation for railroad mail rates can well indicate the manifold
problems involved where the transportation of mail is concerned.
Costs of carrying the mails by the railroads are ascertained upon
a space basis and the carriers receive payment predicated on that
method. Moreover, mail rates have been established for separate
territories and consideration given the length of the railroad's run.
Distinction is also made and rates vary as to mail being carried in
closed pouch space, storage space, storage car, apartment car or
railway postoffice car. Considering all these factors, the Interstate
Commerce Commission established a schedule of rates for each mile of
service ranging from 3.5 cents for mail carried in a 3 foot storage
space to 91 cents for mail transported in a 60 foot railway postoffice
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car. Although this schedule of rates was determined after a very
extensive study analysis made by the I.C.C. in allocating costs and
differentiating services, the magnitude of the problems involved
and the shortcomings of this approach is best illustrated by Commissioner Eastman who stated, "I am not satisfied that our analysis
of costs has been sufficiently penetrating."
The railroad industry loudly complains that through various
Interstate Commerce Commission rules and regulations, it is difficult
for management to exercise very many managerial perogatives and
demonstrate efficiency of operation. The revised Section 15(a) of
the Transportation Act, for example, directs the I.C.C. to give
"due consideration to the effect of the rates upon the movement of
traffic." This direction has the tendency of converting regulation
into management.
Rate making and regulation of any industry touching upon the
public interest, at best is an involved and complicated process. For
over 250 years, since the time of Lord Hale, it has been the law
of the land that where any service rendered is a public one, property
rights are of a qualified nature.
It can thus be seen that mere precedents in other fields of
transportation will not suffice as a basis for rate regulation of the
air carriers.
It is of more than academic interest to briefly trace the evolution
of rate-making as it pertains to the air lines. The first Air Mail
Law, 43 Stat. 805 (1925) gave the Postmaster General the bare
power to let air mail contracts. The Act also provided that the contract rate should not exceed four-fifths of the revenues. In view of
the inherent complications present, however, the method of compensation was changed to a weight basis, before the service was
begun, with a top limit calculated to be within the anticipated receipts.
As contained in the 1926 amendment, 44 Stat. 692 (1926), the contractor was to be paid a flat base rate not to exceed $3.00 per pound
for the first 1,000 miles of carriage with each additional 100 miles
at the rate of 10 per cent of the base rate. It is self-evident that
this method was unsound as no allowance was made for the distance
factor. This led to the establishment of many uneconomic short
routes. It was not until the pay unit was changed from pounds to
airplane-miles and allowance made for the weight differential by
the use of a minimum weight-space, that some correction of basic
errors was effected.
The Watres Act, 46 Stat. 259 (1930) made this adjustment
as well as establishing a base rate of '30 cents per airplane mile for
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the first 100 pound unit, with a graduated increase in base rate
for every additional 100 pounds. Congress, however, ever mindful
of having mail pay maintain a relation to postal revenues, set a top
limit of $1.25 per airplane-mile. This new rate formula represented
a new approach as a carrier was paid for a minimum weight space
per mile regardless if any mail was carried. It also became apparent
to Congress that the $1.25 limitation was meaningless and accordingly
established an arbitrary limit of 15 million dollars for air mail payments during the fiscal year 1930-31.
After the abrupt cancellations of contracts and the subsequent
passage of the Air Mail Act of 1934, regulation of the industry took
another turn. Many of the provisions of the previous law were
retained, but the Act of 1934 made further changes in the rate
structure. Under this law, air mail compensation was paid at fixed
rates per airplane mile, which in no event was to exceed 33 1/3 cents.
This base rate was increased on a sliding scale of 10 per cent for
every additional 100 pound unit carried over the minimum load of
300 pounds. Regardless of the amount of mail carried, compensation
in no event could exceed the limit of 40 cents per plane mile.
As previously indicated, up to this point rates were fixed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission while air mail contracts were
awarded by the Post Office Department as a result of competitive
bidding.
The constructive legislation incorporated in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, among other things, also made possible further
progressive steps in the reahn of rate regulation.
As the Civil Aeronautics Authority, and following the President's Reorganization Order IV, effective July 1, 1940, the Civil
Aeronautics Board, this agency has been fairly consistent in its
decisions pertaining to rate regulation.
In its very first rate decision issued in April 1939, in the case
of Mid-Continent Airlines, the Board established a general formula
for rate making which it has followed ever since. In this instance
the air carrier was given a base rate of 38 cents per plane mile for
an average monthly load up to 300 pounds of mail and 2.5 per cent
of that rate for each additional 25 pounds. Such rates applied on
direct airport-to-airport mileage without reference to any base
mileage.
The Board granted Mid-Continent an increase in rates based
on that carrier's "need" as defined in the law because the line was
able to prove that its operating deficits were largely due to insuffi-
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cient revenues. As a fundamental philosophy of regulation is contained in this decision it may be well to examine it at some length.
The opinion stated: "The air mail rate in each case is to be gauged
in terms of compensation" which will suffice to insure the performance of mail service and with all other revenue enable the carrier
under honest, economical and efficient management to maintain and
continue the development of air transportation as required by the
Commerce, Postal Service and national defense.
The opinion is also clear in that mail compensation should not
cover costs resulting from mismanagement. However, there appears
to be no intention to superimpose governmental management upon
the management of air carriers. The main idea seemingly is that
managerial policies are to be so guided either by the carrier or
by the Board that public expenditures for air transport may yield
the greatest possible results for the public interest.
The decision in this and subsequent rate cases is remarkably
clear in that the policy of rate determination should recognize managerial efficiency and "permit benefit therefrom to redound to the
carriers, thus providing an incentive to management for further
development."
In the Northwest Airlines case, announced in July 1939, an
additional elemnent in rate making was introduced. In this decision,
the system of weight-credit trips, previously in effect as a carryover
from the old Air Mail Act of 1934, was abolished. Starting with
this case all subsequent decisions determined a rate of compensation
based upon the entire mileage flown with mail by the carrier, rather
than a certain selected portion of such mileage. While lowering the
unit rate of pay, the broadening of the mileage base was generally
without effect upon the total amount of the carrier's compensation.
Throughout its decisions and in its first and second anrual
reports the Civil Aireonautics Authority has constantly reiterated its
belief as to the ". . desirability of approaching as rapidly as possible
the time when no supplemental payments, in addition to such reasonable payments for transporting the mail by air, will be paid to air
carriers generally and ......
to fix air-mail rates which will enable
the air carriers, under honest, economical, and efficient management
to maintain and continue the development of an air transportation
system of the character and quality required for the commerce of
the United States, the Postal Service, and the national defense."
In other words, it is the clear-cut policy of the Board to reduce
air mail compensation as the air lines become more self-sufficient.
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Fortunately, the industry is becoming less dependent upon air mail
payments. Table II shows this trend for the industry.
TABLE II*
PRINCIPAL OPERATING REVENUES OF DOMESTIC AIR CARRIERS

Fiscal Year
Ended
June 30

Passenger
Revenues
(000 Omitted)

Mail
Revenues
(000 Omitted)

Express
Revenues
(000 Omitted)

Ratio of
Non-Mail
Revenue of
Total Revenues
(Per Cent)

1940
1939
1938
1937
1936
1935

$43,587
28,300
23,382
21,708
17,908
12,712

$18,536
16,811
14,742
13,166
12,178
8,836

$1,808
1,438
1,215
1,201
805
512

71.49
64.61
63.28
64.90
61.93
61.52

It is also significant that considerable emphases in previous
decisions have been placed on the national defense. Currently, the
normal operations of the air lines are being affected by the national
defense program. It is possible that as a direct result, certain of the
air carriers may experience operating losses. Is it not reasonable
to assume that in subsequent decisions the Board may take this
additional factor intb consideration when making new rate determInations?
No discussion of the air mail rate structure would be complete
without some mention of other proposals in rate-making, which from
all appearances, have not been adopted by the Civil Aeronautics
Board.
Foremost among these proposals is the suggestion that mail
compensation be made on a pound-mile basis. The author showed the
implications of such a plan for BARRON'S-May 15, 1939. At that
time we stated: "It is generally recognized that a pound-mile rate
may be found suitable for the large trunk lines, would fall decidedly
short of even sustaining the light-traffic lines."
The pound-mile method of compensation would measure mail
payments by the volume of operation. It is this basis which United
Air Lines sought in its petition for higher mail pay and which
was turned down by the Board.
It would appear that while the pound-mile method of compensation may have certain desirable features, it is much too rigid
for widespread application in the industry.
* SOURCE: Annual Reports of the Civil Aeronautics
Postmnaster General.

Authority and the
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It has also been suggested that rates be fixed as to provide a
return upon the investment. The difficulties inherent in this theory
became readily apparent. To begin with, which basis for investment
should be adopted: "reproduction cost or prudent invest." Moreover it would also mean tying the industry'to a fixed rate base with
all of its complications.
It would be highly desirable to prevent the air transport industry
from being irrevocably tied to a rate base. The public utility
industry illustrates the difficulties and confusion introduced in attempting to find a rate base acceptable to all concerned. The historic
Smyth v. Ames case decided in 1898 by the United States Supreme
Court stands to this day as the basis in which current cost of reproduction was declared to be a primary utility valuation factor. Under this
theory, the objective is to estimate the present value of the property
and not its actual aggregate cost, or its value at the time of construction or acquisition. Such a determination, it is argued, opens up a
fruitful field of endless controversy as to what should and should not
be omitted from the multitude of component parts of the complicated
process of evaluating a public utility. A period of 122 years elapsed
before the Illinois Bell Telephone Company had its properties
properly evaluated for rate making purposes. It is argued further,
that the reproduction cost theory in rate regulation is too complicated, conjectural, expensive, unsatisfactory and unworkable and
regulatory bodies therefore in many cases are forced to give mere lip
service to its observance in order to conform to legal formula.
To simplify the evaluating process and at the same time lower
the rate base, it has been recommended that the "prudent investment"
theory of rate making be adopted.
Interestingly enough, a present member of the Civil Aeronautics
Authority while General Counsel of the Federal Power Commission
argued in behalf of the adoption of the "prudent investment" theory
of rate making before the Supreme Court, and upon direct questioning by Justice McReynolds defined "prudent investment" as "the
actual money investment made in the property used and useful in
the public service."
The Transportation Act of 1920, made provision for railroad
rates that would be so established as to return a "fair" return on the
value of the property. This rate was set at 6 per cent with all excess
profits being recaptured by the Government. Not only was proper
evaluation of the rate base almost an impossible undertaking, but it
is estimated that it cost the Interstate Commerce Commission and
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the railroads approximately $178,000,000 to partially complete these
valuation studies.
Moreover, for fear of recapture of excess profits, the railroads
expended excessive sums towards maintenance and new equipment.
It is noteworthy that while the Board has strongly asserted that
it is not dealing with the question of a fixed return upon a fixed
investment, each case must nevertheless be examined in terms of
the relation of the profit on the investment. A true reward for
managerial efficiency should make possible a satisfactory return upon
the invested capital.

